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NOTES
mized by the designated person or issue who are alive or who were
conceived at the time of distribution.
The enactment of such a statute would put Ohio in line with the better
definition of "issue" and with her important commercial and industrial
sister states.
WLLA I J. HUNTER, JR.
Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MILITARY JURISDICTION
OVER A DISCHARGED SERVICEMAN
More than five months after receiving an honorable discharge from
the U. S. Air Force, a former enlisted man was arrested by the military.
He was charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) 1
with the murder of a Korean civilian prior to his discharge. Jurisdiction
was predicated on Article 3(a) 2 of the U.C.M.J.
Habeas corpus proceedings were instituted in the United States Dis-
trict Court,3 and the prisoner was released4 on non-constitutional grounds.
The United States Court of Appeals reversed, 5 holding Article 3 (a) con-
stitutional
The Supreme Court of the United States, on certiorari, reversed the
Court of Appeals, and held6 that Article 3 (a) could not be sustained as
constitutional.7 The Court held that the military powers granted to Con-
gress by Article I section 8 of the Constitution restricted military juris-
'Articles 118 and 81 of the U.C.M.J., 64 STAT. 140 and 134, 50 U.S.C. §§ 712 and
675.
'Article 3(a) U.C.M.J., 64 STAT. 109, 50 U.S.C. § 553, which provides: "... any
person charged with having committed while in a status in which he was subject to
this code, an offense against this code, punishable by confinement of five years or
more for which the person cannot be tried in the courts of the United States or any
State or Territory thereof or of the District of Columbia, shall not be relieved from
amenability to trial by courts-martial by reason of the termination of said status."
8 United States ex rel. Toth v. Talbott, 113 F. Supp. 330 (D.C.D.C. 1953).
'United States ex rel. Toth v. Talbott, 114 F. Supp. 468 (D.C.D.C. 1953).
'Talbott v. United States ex rel. Toth, 215 F.2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
"United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, - U.S. - , 76 Sup. Ct. 1 (1955).
'U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cls. 10, 11, 12, 14 and 18 do not aid the government. In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 8, d. 14: "to make rules for the government" and "to regu-
late the land and naval forces." Cognizance of this power is taken in the exception
to the fifth amendment: "except in cases arising in the land and naval forces." This
exception, however, does not create a system of courts nor jurisdiction. See 9 NOTRE
DABM LAW, 26 (1933).
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diction to persons actually members of the Armed forces. Justice Black,
in writing the majority opinion, reasoned that the expansion of courts-
martial jurisdiction attempted under Article 3(a) "encroaches on the
Federal Courts under Article III of the Constitution where persons on
trial are surrounded with more constitutional safeguards than in military
tribunals."
Military tribunals, Justice Black continued, are not and cannot be con-
stituted in such a way as to qualify under the Constitution as courts.9
The U.C.M.J. was enacted10 by Congress under Article I section 8 of
the Constitution." Article 3 (a) of that Code was inserted specifically
to cure the defect resulting from the inability of the military to try a dis-
charged serviceman for a crime committed prior to his discharge.' 2
Although the military establishment has possessed similar statutory
authority ior over ninety years,13 the question of whether this continuing
jurisdiction over a discharged serviceman violates the Constitution has
never been satisfactorily resolved.14
'The majority gives two instances in which this is true: juries (grand and petit) and
judges. As to the former, the court said: "But whether right or wrong, the premise
underlying the constitutional method for determining the guilt or innocence in fed-
eral courts is that laymen are better than specialists to perform this task. This idea
is inherent in the institution of trial by jury." 75 Sup. Ct. at 5-6.
As to judges, the majority stated: "The provision of Article III was devised to
give judges maximum freedom from possible coercion or influence by the executive
or legislative branches of the government. . . . They [the military "judges"] are
appointed by military commanders and may be removed at will." 75 Sup. Ct. at 5.
1 0May 31, 1951. Pub. L. No. 506, 81st Cong. 5 5, c.169 (May 5, 1950).
See note 8 supra.
'Hirshberg v. Cook, 336 U.S. 210 (1949); lit re Lo Dolce, 106 F. Supp. 455
(W.D.N.Y. 1952); Hironimus v. Durant, 168 F.2d 288 (4th Cit. 1948); Hearings
before Subcommittee of House Committee on Armed Services on H.R. 2498, 81st
Cong., 1st sess. 5, 11 (1949); S. Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st sess. 8 (1949).
112 STAT. 696 (1863). This was substantially reenacted in Article of War 94, 41
STAT. 805 (1920), which was the predecessor to Article 3 (a).
"' There is some dispute as to whether the precedents cited by the court of appeals
and the dissent in the Supreme Court decision are substantial authority. In re
Bogert, 3 Fed. Cas. 796, no. 1596 (C.C.D. Cal. 1873) was one of the first cases de-
cided. Using a dictum from Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), the
court affirmed the validity of Article 94 of the Articles of War after interpreting
"cases" in the fifth amendment to mean "crime committed." Ex parte Joly, 29a
Fed. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), without considering the rationale, the court felt bound
by the Bogert case. The court in Terry v. United States, 2 F. Supp. 962 (W.D.
Wash. 1933) felt bound by the two preceding cases and upheld the validity of the
act. Because of the long passage of time, the court in Kronberg v. Hale, 180 F.2d
128 (9th Cir. 1950) reached the same result. One case, prior in time to the Kron-
berg case, reached a contrary result: Flannery v. Commanding General, 69 F. Supp.
661 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). See 42 GEo. L. J. 545 (1954). Thus, quaere: Has this
question ever been satisfactorily resolved before? See 67 HARv. L. REv. 479 (1954)
and Snedeker, Jurisdiction of Naval Courts-Martial Over Civilians, 24 NOTE DAMR
LAW, 490 (1945).
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It has always been the policy of the Supreme Court in reviewing a
court-martial judgment to concern itself only with the determination of
jurisdiction. 15 The Court in the instant case did not deviate from this
rule. By holding Article 3 (a) unconstitutional, the Court found that the
military had no jurisdiction over the person of a civilian.
Under "civilian law" the locus of the criminal offense is determinative
of jurisdiction over the person. The status of the accused is immaterial.
Under military law the opposite is true.' In in Ire Grimley,17 it was held
that the taking of the oath of induction, or any other ceremony prescribed,
is the jurisdictional fact which changes civilian status to military status
and subjects the individual to military jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court in the instant case complemented these "status-
changing" cases by affirmatively holding that an unconditional discharge
is a change of status from the military back to civilian.'
More important than the distinction between locus and status is the
age-old philosophy of two distinct systems of adjudication - the civil
courts and the military tribunals. This philosophy stems from the fact
that the civil courts and the military tribunals are established by two
separate powers of Congress: Article III of the Constitution establishes
civil courts; Article I section 8 establishes military tribunals.
Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of
military offenses ... and the power to do so is given without any connec-
tion between it and Article III of the Constitution... ; indeed the two
powers are entirely independent of each other."
"Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953); Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128 (1950);
Whelchel v. MacDonald, 340 U.S. 122 (1950); Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103
(1950); Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949); United States v. Tobita, 3
U.S.C.M.A. 267, 12 C.MfRL 23 (1953); U.S. v. Padilla & Jacobs, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 603,
5 C.M.R. 31 (1952). See 32 N.C.L. Rev. 1 (1953).
" Durant v. Hiatt, 81 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Ga. 1948); Ex parte MUlligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2 (1866); U.S. v. Solinsky, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 153, 7 C.M.R. 29 (1953); Art.
2 U.C.M.J., 50 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1952); Art. 3 U.C.M.J., 50 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp.
1952). See Snedeker, Jurisdiction of Naval Courts-Martial Over Civilians, 24 Notre
Dame Law, 490 (1945): "The obligation ... determines the status and the status
... determines the power of Congress to provide ... a means of criminal prosecu-
tion other than by jury."
7137 U.S. 147 (1890); United States v. Perry, 1 C.M.R. 516 (1951). Thus a
serviceman cannot be tried for a criminal offense committed by him before he ac-
quired military status, even though the offense is one prohibited by military law.
United States v. Logan, 31 C.M.R. 363 (1944); Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S.
542 (1944).
"Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, paragraph Ila, p. 19; Hirshberg
v. Cook, 336 U.S. 210 (1949); Ex parte Wilson, 33 F.2d 214 (E.D. Va. 1929);
U.S. v. Santiago, 1 C.M.R. 365 (1951); Article of War 81, 41 STAT. 809 (1920),
10 U.S.C. § 1580 (1946).
"Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How)
65 (1857).
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A Congressional act as broad and sweeping in its application as Article
3(a) not only narrows the gap between the two systems, but it enters
an area which is to be solely occupied under Article III by civil courts
(not military tribunals). The entry is attempted by Congress through
the power granted in Article I, although Article I was not intended to
procure jurisdiction over civilians.20 The Supreme Court in examining
the validity of Article 3 (a) weighed the right of a civilian to constitution-
al safeguards against the necessity of trial by military tribunal.
It is true, the test of Congressional power, as the dissent points out,2 '
is that an act of Congress bear a reasonable relation and is plainly ap-
propriate to the proposed end.22  The majority is not questioning the
merit of the proposed end which is that a criminal shall not go unpun-
ished. The majority, however, is questioning the reasonableness of the
Congressional act. By applying a stricter test than the one used by the
dissent, the Court limited the Legislature to "the least possible power ade-
quate to the end proposed (emphasis supplied) ."23 The result is con-
sistent with other cases in which fundamental personal liberties have been
involved.
24
In effect, the Supreme Court has established another boundary of
that evasive term due process. 25 They have drawn the line beyond which
Congress can not go. They have saved the courts the burdensome task
of deciding what is and what is not due process in each individual case
involving ex-military personnel
'o See note 7 supra.
276 Sup. Ct. 1, 13 (1955).
'McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821). See note 23 of the
majority opinion. Another factor which played an important part in this decision
was the alternative solution offered Congress, viz. to give the federal courts jurisdic-
tion over discharged servicemen. Hearings before Committee on Armed Services on
S. 951 and H.R. 4080, 81st Cong., Ist sess. 256 (1949). At that time Brigadier
General Green proposed this alternative to prevent adverse criticism of the military
for usurping too much federal power. Also, "'you preserve the constitutional separa-
tion of military and civil courts .. " There is no constitutional objection to this
measure: see 76 Sup. Ct. 1 (1955) for cases cited.
'The right to freedom of speech outweighs interference with the administration of
justice. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 (1941). The right to counsel outweighs the efficient prosecution of
crime. DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932). The right to religious freedom outweighs the power to demand
expressions of loyalty, W. Va. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The right to trial
by jury outweighs the convenience of trial by military tribunal. Duncan v. Kahan-
amoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
'Ex parte MacDonald, 76 Ala. 603 (1884); People v. Tilkin, 34 Cal. App.2d 89,
90 P.2d 148 (1939); Gilmer v. Bird, 15 Fla. 410 (1875); Bardwell v. Collins, 44
Minn. 97, 46 N.W. 315 (1890); Hallenbeck v. Hahn, 2 Neb. 377 (1872); Stuart
v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183 (1878); Gaffney v. Jones, 44 Wash. 158, 87 Pac. 114
(1906).
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